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I. Introduction 
In a recent paper on behavior in experimental securities markets, 
Plott and Sunder (1982) concluded that the rational expectations (RE) 
model was superior to the traditional prior information (Pl) model in 
predicting equilibrium prices and holdings. In particular, given a 
market with one commodity, three possible states of the world, and 
three groups of trader "types," each with differing valuations on the 
commodity per state, initially uninformed traders were able to infer 
the underlying state from the current market price and act accord­
ingly. In a related paper, Friedman, Harrison, and Salmon (1984) 
observed that, given the existence of a futures market, the RE model 
outperformed the Pl model in multiperiod, single-commodity mar­
kets as well. One source of potential misinterpretation, however, 
comes from the fact that, although one-half of the traders of each 
type were informed of the true state at the beginning of each period 
in Plott and Sunder ( 1982) and one-third of the traders of each type 
in Friedman, Harrison, and Salmon (1984), the same traders were 
informed in almost every period. 1 In a more recent paper, Plott and
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Sunder ( 1983) constructed markets where all traders received partial
information (i.e., given possible states X, Y, and Z, a trader's private
information would be either "not X" or "not Y" if the state were Z), 
yet the combinations of traders receiving a certain message in any 
period were determined randomly. Hence no trader could be 
identified as having some constant bit of information. In the single­
commodity markets, Plott and Sunder (1983) concluded that the RE 
model did not perform as well as the PI model in their respective 
predictions. Thus, given the fixed-information structure of Plott and 
Sunder ( 1982) and Friedman, Harrison, and Salmon ( 1984), one can­
not ignore the possibility that, in these experiments, initially unin­
formed traders guessed the identities of the informed traders and 
then used their observed behavior to gain knowledge of the state, as 
opposed to gaining knowledge from the market bids, ·offers, and 
prices. 
In the experiment discussed below, an attempt was made to over­
come this problem. The experiment consisted of replicating experi­
ment 5 of Plott and Sunder ( 1982), altering only the information 
structure so that each trader was informed of the state in at least 2 
periods (out of a possible IO) and then randomizing over which pe­
riods a trader was informed. This structure was designed to limit the 
ability of uninformed traders to infer the identities of the informed 
traders, since in each period different combinations of traders were 
informed. Such a replication, with equivalent empirical results, would 
provide strong evidence to support the conjecture that holding the 
informed traders constant did not generate the results reported in 
Plott and Sunder ( 1982) and Friedman, Harrison, and Salmon (1984). 
II. Experimental Design 
The market consisted of three possible states, labeled X, Y, and Z, and
three trader types, I, II, and III. Each type consisted of four traders, 
for a total of 12. The parameters, as shown in table I •. were chosen to 
conform to those of Plott and Sunder ( 1982), with the exception that 
the probability of any state occurring was simplified to one-third for 
each state. Each trader had a number of information and record 
sheets, one for each period, which consisted of possible valuations 
(one per state), initial endowments (held constant for all traders and 
for all periods at two securities and I 0,000 francs), and room to keep 
running totals of securities and currency. At the end of each period, 
profits were calculated and recorded on a separate profit sheet. (Ex­
amples of these and a complete description of the design can be 
found in Plott and Sunder [ 1982].) 
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Traders were told rhal lhe lrue slale for a period was determined 
randomly by choosing one ball out of a bingo cage containing 30 halls,
numbered 1-30. If the ball chosen was numbered I-IO, 1he state was
X; if the ball was numbered 1 1-20, the slate was Y; and so forth. 
Traders were told that, in lhe interest of rime, the sequence of actual 
states had been determined by chis method prior w the experimenl. 
Before trading commenced in a period, the traders were handed a 
3" x 5" card containing one of the following: (i) X, (ii) Y, (iii) Z, or (iv) 
a blank. If a trader was handed a card with an X showing, the �alue of 
the security was the X value, which would be paid to him or her for 
any securities held al the end of the trading period; if the card 
showed a Y, rhe Y value would be paid; and so forth. This informa­
tion was privare, and two craders of each type were informed of the 
Slate in every period, though the identities of rhe informed traders 
varied. Traders were told that the means by which a rrader's private 
information was chosen were random, though in realiry the informa­
tion structure was predetermined, as discussed in Section I. 
The market was organized as an oral double auction, and traders 
were free lo buy and sell securities as rhey wished, one security at a 
time, subject only lo the "improvement" rule on bids (to buy) and 
offers (to sell): any bid by a trader must be higher than the bid out­
standing in the market, and any offer must be lower than any offer 
outstanding. Afrer a rransacrion was closed, the bidding process be­
gan anew. Each period lasred 7 minules, with warnings at 5 minutes, 6 
minutes, 6 minutes 30 seconds, and 6 minutes 50 seconds. 
III. Models
The tradirional PI equilibrium hypothesis assumes that traders will 
condition their behavior only on their private information, ignoring 
any informalion gained from observing the market price. Thus, for 
instance, if we assume risk neutraliry on the part of rhe traders, when 
the scare X occurs, in the Pl equilibrium uninformed rype I traders 
should be holding all the securiries at the end of the trading period, 
with a market price of 203. In contrast, the RE equilibrium hypothesis 
suggesls that traders will condition rheir behavior on both their pri­
vate information and the market price; if rhe state-price correspon­
dence is known with certainty and is one-to-one, uninformed traders 
can infer the stale from the market price and thus can become in­
formed. Hence the RE prediction, given the X state, is that the in­
formed and uninformed type III traders should be holding all securi­
ties al rhe end of the period, with a market price of 180. The 
reasoning is that the type I uninformed traders "learn" that the slale 
is X and thus are willing to pay only 120 (as opposed w 203), while 
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type III uninformed traders also "learn" and thus are willing lo pay 
I 80 (as opposed to 14 7). Thus, when the state is X, the PI and RE 
predictions are disjoint. 
Note that, given the paramerers in table I, the PI and RE predic­
tions for scares Y and Z differ only in the holdings of uninformed
traders; in the Y state, PI predins that type II informed traders will 
hold the final securities at a market price of 245, while RE predicts 
tha(both informed and uninformed type II traders will hold at a 
market price of 245; in the Z state, PI predicts that type I informed
traders will hold final securities at a market price of 320, while RE 
predicts that both informed and uninformed type I lraders should 
hold at a market price of 320. Hence the separation of predictions in 
states Y and Z is quite sensitive to the assumptions of risk neutrality
and learning the state with certainty from the price. 
IV. Results
The time series of prices for the I 0 periods are shown in figure I .  The 
sequence of states was the same as in Plott and Sunder (I 982) excepl 
that I ran only I period with no information (as opposed to 3), which 
was the first period, and I did not replicale the final period. As can be 
seen, prices converged to rhe RE predicted price in rhe X states and to
the price-equivalent Pl and RE predictions in the Y and Z states. To
compare these results with those of Plott and Sunder ( 1982), let us 
examine the average and final prices in each period in relarion to the 
prices predicted by the RE and PI models. These data are found in 
table 2. We see thal, in periods 2, 5, and 6, average and final prices 
were actually closer to rhe RE-predicted prices in the current experi­
ment; period 4 shows rhe opposite result, while the remaining periods 
are roughly equal. Thus we can conclude that the fixed-information 
structure of Plott and Sunder ( 1982) had Iiule to do with price conver­
gence. 
Table 3 lists the number of securities in the "wrong" hands at the 
end of each period, given the PI and RE predictions, for both Plott 
and Sunder ( l  982) and the current experiment. Recall that the pre­
dictions for states Y and Z differ only in final holdings, so that the
results in table 3 are importanl in discriminating between the two 
models. As can be seen, the RE model outperforms the PI model in all 
bur I period (interestingly, Pl does better in the same period as in 
Pion and Sunder). Any conclusions drawn from table 3 must be 
viewed with caution, however, for by the nalure of rhe predictions, it 
is rechnically impossible for the Pl model to do strictly beuer rhan the 
RE model in slates Y and Z, since the set of lraders holding in the PI 
prediction is a proper subset of the traders holding in the RE predic-
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tion. Notice that the PI model does extremely well in periods 6, 8, and 
I 0 of the current experiment yet still cannot (and could not) over­
come the RE prediction. 
Figures 2a and 2b provide data on the ability of traders to learn the 
state-price correspondence. Figure 2a shows the ratio of average 
profits for buyers to average profits for sellers under the RE model. 
As Plott and Sunder claim, "The ratio of profits of agents predicted 
by the RE model to he buyers to those of the predicted sellers reflects 
the degree of knowledge about the state-price correspondence ... 
therefore, profits of buyers and sellers might reasonably be expected 
to be equal if the equilibrium-price correspondence has been revealed
and understood" ( 1982, p. 687). The Plott and Sunder ( 1982) data
were used to conclude that the agents did become informed of this 
correspondence. The cu1-rent data suggest that changing the infor­
mation structure lessens the variability of the ratio and, more impor­
tant, gives consistently higher values in the final periods relative to the 
Plott and Sunder results. Notice that the large jumps in periods 4 and 
5 come after a change in the state from the previous period and that 
this jump occurs in both sets of data. 
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Fie. 2.-a, Ratio of average profits for RE buyers to RE sellers. b, Ratio of informed 
trader profits to uninformed trader profits. 
Figure 2b depicts the ratio of profits of informed traders to those of 
uninformed traders for both Plott and Sunder ( l 982) and the current
experiment. Plott and Sunder claim that this is a measure of the 
ability of uninformed traders to learn the state from the price, that is, 
their ability to use the inverse of the state-price correspondence. Plott 
and Sunder concluded that, over time, uninformed traders were able 
to learn the state; hence the values near l 00 in the last 4 periods. The 
current data suggest that, by changing the information structure, we 
again have lessened the variability of the ratio over time, and again we 
see the values for the final periods remaining above those for Plott 
and Sunder. 
V. Conclusion 
The results of the new experiment confirm the conclusions of Plott 
and Sunder ( 1982) regarding the price dynamics of the market; how­
ever, they also weaken their claim that uninformed traders learn the 
state from the market price. Figures 2a and 2b show that, although 
the markets become in a sense "more revealing" over time, the fixed­
information structure of Plott and Sunder could well have overstated 
COMMENTS 815 
this revelation. Thus the conclusions drawn from their late-period 
data should not be made without regard to this potential bias. Simi­
larly, the Friedman, Harrison, and Salmon (1984) results on informa­
tional efficiency in the presence of futures markets could have been 
driven, to some extent, by this same phenomenon. As for Plott and 
Sunder (1983), we can conclude that their results are derived mainly
from the incomplete nature of the private information and the inabil­
ity of the market (or the traders) to aggregate the diverse information 
into a state-revealing signal. 
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